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Abstract:   
We estimate a two-equation model to jointly determine the number of informal in-
vestors and the amount of money that they invest over the last 3 years.  Our model 
uses data on 126,189 individuals in 21 highly developed countries in the period 
2002-2006. We delve deeper into the hypothesis of Burke et al (2010) that ‘the demand 
for informal venture finance tends to generate its own supply’.  To our knowledge, we 
undertake the first research to move analysis of the supply of informal venture finance 
investment beyond estimating the propensity for a person to become an informal inves-
tor and onto the core concern which is the total volume of venture finance.  We find that 
a one per cent increase in entrepreneurial activity increases the number of informal 
investors by 1.702 per cent. However, the average invested amount declines by 
0.827 per cent leading to a net positive total increase by 0.861 per cent. This result 
indicates that, to a considerable extent, demand for informal investment creates its 
own supply. This effect is stronger for males than females.  We also find that the 
level of venture capital investment has a net positive effect on the level of informal 
investment and that this effect is stronger for females than males. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Informal venture finance is the main source of external equity finance for business 
start-ups (Berger and Udell, 1990, and Bygrave et al., 2003).  Compared to other 
forms of venture finance it is typically earlier stage. It is arguably the most impor-
tant type of venture finance as it is focused at the start-up stage of business ventur-
ing where finance constraints are most acute i.e. most venture capital and loan fi-
nance is focused on lower risk and larger increment later stage finance.  Informal 
venture finance comprises several forms of investment encompassing a spectrum 
from professional business angels through to amateurs.  The importance of infor-
mal venture finance investment is also underlined by the fact that it is the biggest 
form of investment for new ventures – even business angel finance which is a sub-
set of informal venture finance investment, has been shown to be larger than ven-
ture capital (Sohl, 1999, and Mason and Harrison, 2000). Despite its importance 
there has been no research to our knowledge which has addressed the pivotal ques-
tion of: what determines the volume of informal venture finance investment? There 
have been several studies which extensively describe and analyze the characteris-
tics  and  behaviour  of  informal  investors  (e.g.  Hessels,  2005,  Hindle  and  Rush-
worth, 2001, Wong and Ho, 2007, Maula et al., 2005, Szerb et al., 2007, Burke et 
al., 2010) and in the process give an insight into the question of who becomes an 
informal investor.   
 
However, none have focused on the more important question of what determines 
the total level of investment undertaken by informal investors? This paper aims to 
fill this gap by jointly investigating the determinants of both the prevalence and 
the investment volumes of informal investors. The objective, therefore, is to ex-
plain the total level of informal investment in an economy which is simply the 
number of informal investors multiplied by the total amount invested per investor 
over the last 3 years. So the current paper builds on the work of Burke et al (2010) 
who investigated the relationship between entrepreneurial activity and the number 
of informal investors.  They find a virtuous interactive effect where the demand for 
informal investment finance by entrepreneurs tends to generate some of its own 
supply.  Hence the novelty of their paper is the finding of a market force which 
promotes market clearing in a market most known for finance gaps and constraints.  
This paper takes the analysis to the next logical step which is to estimate the de-
terminants of the level of investment undertaken by informal investors so that an 
aggregate economy level net effect of entrepreneurial activity on the total level (in 
money terms) of informal investment can be estimated.   
 
We also investigate how the determinants of total investment volumes differ be-
tween men and women.  There is extensive evidence to support the view that fe-
male entrepreneurs face greater financial constraints than men in terms of debt and 
venture capital.
1  There has been less research on the gender dimension of business 
angel finance (Brush et al 2004, Amatucci and Sohl 2004, Becker-Blease and Sohl, 
2007). Females account for a minority – typically less than 5% (Harrison and Ma-
son, 2007) - of business angels. This can affect the supply of funds available to 
female entrepreneurs if female investors are more likely to invest in female entre-
preneurs.  There has been no research to our knowledge on the gender dimension 
 
1 There is a considerable body of research indicating that female entrepreneurs find it more difficult to raise 
loan finance than males (Riding and Swift 1990, Fay and Williams 1993, Carter and Rosa 1998 and Verheul 
and Thurik 2001).    5 
of  the  determinants  of  the  total  volume  of  informal  venture  finance  investment 
which comprises business angel finance and funding by the 3Fs – friends, family 
and fools (Bygrave et al., 2003, and Sohl, 1999, 2003).
2  In terms of finance gaps 
early stage finance for women is acutely important for entrepreneurial economic 
performance and on this basis alone deserves a special analysis.  Therefore, our 
analysis also extends to address the related question of the assessing how the de-
termination of the volume of informal venture finance investment varies by gender.  
 
To these ends we employ a data base of 126,189 individuals in 21 highly devel-
oped countries that participated in the Global Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM) in 
the period 2002-2006. For the individuals in the data base, it is known whether 
they informally invest, and if so, how much. Lots of other characteristics are avail-
able as well. Using these data, we estimate a two-equation model, explaining the 
prevalence of being an informal investor and the amount invested. To the best of 
our knowledge this is the first paper to estimate the determinants of the total sup-
ply of informal investment. In doing so, we aim to give some new insights into one 
of the key drivers of the entrepreneurial economy. 
  
In the estimation model, we distinguish between micro-level and macro-level de-
terminants. For the micro-level determinants we find that involvement in entrepre-
neurial activity – whether ongoing or having resulted in exit – increases the prob-
ability of becoming an informal investor. Regarding the amount invested, informal 
investors who currently own a business, or who think they have the skills to start a 
new business are likely to make a higher investment. The former effect (owning a 
business) primarily applies to women whereas the latter effect (self-efficacy) pri-
marily applies to men.  Focusing on the macro-level variables we find that a coun-
try’s level of entrepreneurial activity increases the supply of informal investors but 
decreases the amount invested per investor. Nevertheless, at the macro level these 
results together imply a positive relation between a country’s level of entrepreneu-
rial activity and the total amount of informal investment. Hence, to some extent the 
demand for informal investment (indicated by entrepreneurial activity) creates its 
own supply. We find this effect is stronger for males rather than females which 
may indicate some homophily gender bias in informal investor decisions.   
 
Our results also suggest that a higher level of formal venture capital investment 
(VCI) leads to a higher total level of informal investment. This net effect arises 
from a positive effect of VCI on the number of informal investors (likely to be a 
complementary effect due to increased opportunities for exit and/or follow on VCI 
finance) overpowering a negative (substitution/competition) effect of VCI on the 
amount invested per informal investor.  This net positive effect is mainly a female 
driven outcome. This may be due to the fact that when VCI levels are high, compe-
tition among traditional (male dominated) VCI funds forces VC finance into more 
female ventures and hence due to homophily gender bias has a stronger net com-
plementary effect on female informal investors.  
 
 
The organization of the paper is as follows. The next section describes the data and the-
ory to be tested. This section also describes the variables and data sources employed in 
 
2 O’Gorman and Terjesen (2006) address a very different research question. They look at statistical differences be-
tween the profiles of male and female investors and entrepreneurs in Ireland. They do not estimate either the determi-
nants of a person becoming an informal investor nor the amount that they invest.     6 
this paper. Since the investment volumes of informal investors are rarely used in em-
pirical work, this section also contains a large array of descriptive statistics concerning 
prevalence and investment volumes of informal investors. Section 3 describes the esti-
mation methods used to estimate prevalence and investment volumes of informal inves-
tors. The final sections provide estimation results and conclusions. 
 
 
2. Theory and data 
 
Burke et al. (2010) proposed the general hypothesis that the demand for entrepre-
neurial finance can generate its own supply. The proposition has significant rele-
vance for policy as it indicates a degree of inter-temporal market clearing in the 
realm  of  early  stage  venture  finance  –  the  area  most  noted  for  venture  finance 
gaps. A key argument proposed by Burke et al (2010) is that greater human and fi-
nancial  capital  (particularly  that  accumulated  through  entrepreneurship)  relevant 
for business angels are likely to increase the rate of return on informal investment 
activity. This increases both the number of people who choose to become informal 
investors and the amount invested per investor. Burke et al (2010) only test the 
first part of this central hypothesis by estimating the impact of macro and micro 
measures of entrepreneurial activity on the prevalence of informal investment ac-
tivity. The results support the central hypotheses. The purpose of this paper is to 
push the analysis to its logical conclusion in order to assess the impact of entrepre-
neurial activity on the total level of informal investment - which is itself equal to 
the number of informal investors multiplied by the total amount invested per inves-
tor over the last 3 years. The aim is to be able to assess how the total level of in-
formal  venture  finance  responds  to  entrepreneurial  activity  and  other  core  eco-
nomic data. This will help policy makers better understand the economic circum-
stances in which there is most likely to be a deficient supply of informal venture 
finance  but  also  the  extent  to  which  this  finance  gap  is  self-correcting  through 
natural market dynamics.  
 
Micro relationships 
Since the theory in Burke et al (2010) is mainly focused on the determinants of the 
propensity to become an informal investor we need to augment this with some dis-
cussion of theory relating to the determinants of the amount of investment per in-
vestor. If one takes a short term fixed endowment of human and financial capital 
view then a classical economics limited resource allocation challenge arises.  Ev-
ans and Jovanovic (1989), Burke et al (2000) and Campbell (2003) find the exis-
tence of finance constraints among entrepreneurs, and if one assumes a person’s 
endowment of resources is fixed then more resources devoted to being an entre-
preneur leaves less available for informal investment.  In this light, one would ex-
pect a negative micro relationship between a person being an entrepreneur and the 
amount of money they would be likely to invest in a new venture. 
 
However,  if one considers  longer  term  effects then  an  accumulative  rather than 
trade-off micro relationship can exist between a person being an entrepreneur and 
the amount of informal investment that they make.  Mason (2006) and The Econ-
omist (2006) note that prior to becoming informal investors people were often en-
trepreneurs.  The evolution from entrepreneur to informal investor is driven by the 
finance  received  from  business  harvest  and  exit  activity  (Mason  and  Harrison, 
2006). So over a longer time horizon entrepreneurial activity might enhance rather 
than deplete a person’s financial endowment available for informal investment.  In   7 
addition, having already earned a good return on investment in their own business 
entrepreneurs are likely to be tempted to try investment in another entrepreneurial 
type investment. Thus, in this scenario one would expect a positive micro relation-
ship between entrepreneurship and the amount of informal investment undertaken.   
 
This outcome becomes even more likely if one considers the roles of human capital 
and non pecuniary motivation.  The factors associated with determining the choice 
to become an entrepreneur such as business skills, tolerance for risk and uncer-
tainty, and enjoyment from the excitement associated with new ventures (Knight, 
1921, Burke et al., 2000, Campbell, 2003, Kelly, 2007, and Riding et al., 2007) are 
among the same attributes that attracts people to become informal investors (Burke 
et al, 2010).  Some of these attributes may be enhanced by being an entrepreneur.  
Business skills can be enhanced by experience in entrepreneurship and likewise 
risk management skills are likely to be enhanced through real life experience of 
having to deal with risk.  Uncertainty is reduced as entrepreneurial experience cre-
ates a more informed understanding of the risks and rewards of business venturing 
alongside a better understanding of the venture finance process.  So combined the-
se factors have potential to increase the amount invested by entrepreneurs.  This 
leads to theorem 1. 
  
Theorem 1: At the micro level, the effect of entrepreneurial activity on the amount 
of investment by informal investors will be negative or positive, dependent on 





In addition to testing the micro relationships between an individual’s entrepreneu-
rial activity and the scale of the investment undertaken by the same individual we 
also look at the macro relationship between a country’s level of entrepreneurial ac-
tivity and the amount of investment undertaken by each individual – and then af-
terwards aggregate the latter up to a macro effect.  The greater the level of total en-
trepreneurial activity (TEA) the more informal investment opportunities that exist.  
If investors perceive this as a greater supply of good investment opportunities then 
the number of informal investors will increase (evidence to support this is gener-
ated in Burke et al, 2010).  However, the impact on the amount invested per infor-
mal investor is less clear.  More investment opportunities may create greater scope 
to spread a given investment fund across a wider range of investments in a bid to 
reduce risk.  It may also cause increased competition for funds among entrepre-
neurs and so imply that investors can place smaller investment amounts to gain the 
same amount of equity.  These effects would cause a negative macro relationship 
between TEA and the amount of money invested per informal investor.  But it is 
also plausible the greater ability to reduce risk through a wider portfolio of in-
vestment as well as cheaper equity through greater competition among entrepre-
neurs may actually cause informal investors to increase the amount of money they 
invest in business ventures.  
 
Theorem 2: If the net effect of entrepreneurial activity on the number of people 
choosing to become informal investors and the amount they invest is positive then 
at the macro level, the demand for informal investment (as indicated by total en-
trepreneurial activity) will have a positive impact on total supply. 
   8 
It is also possible that the level of formal venture capital investment (VCI) can 
lead to a higher total level of informal investment. Venture capital can present op-
portunities for informal investors (who are usually early stage investors) to exit 
thereby increasing the liquidity and hence value of informal investment.  Similarly, 
venture capital can increase the value of early stage informal investment by pro-
viding a supply of follow-on rounds of later stage finance for the same venture.  
These effects promote a positive relationship between VCI and both the number of 
people choosing to make informal investments and the amount that they invest.  
However, a proportion of VCI is typically targeted at early stage investment and 
hence  is  in  competition  with  informal  investment.  Gompers  and  Lerner  (1999) 
show a positive relationship between VCI levels and the proportion of venture cap-
ital devoted to early stage investments.  This would thereby promote a negative re-
lationship between the level of VCI and both the number of people choosing to 
make informal investment and the amount that they invest.  Combined these effects 
lead to Theorem 3: 
 
Theorem 3: VCI will have a positive effect on the total supply of informal 
investment if  the  positive  complementary  effects of  exit  and follow-on fi-




The gender dimension of entrepreneurial finance has highlighted the importance of 
networks, self-efficacy, confidence, and risk taking.  Social behaviour is such that 
people can gravitate towards others who are similar to themselves and in this man-
ner  entrepreneurial  networks  can  have  a  degree  of  gender  segregation  (Moore 
1990, Ruef et al, 2003).  If gender homophily also extends to business angels and 
likewise to their  preference to invest  in  entrepreneurs  of  the same  sex  then  the 
male  dominance  of  business  angel  networks  may  pose  a  considerable  financial 
constraint for female entrepreneurship (Aldrich 1989, Verheul and Thurik 2001, 
Ruef et al 2003, and Harrison and Mason 2007).  Gender homophily could, there-
fore, play a positive moderating role on the positive relationship found by Burke et 
al (2010) where higher levels of entrepreneurial activity in an economy generate a 
greater supply of informal venture finance investors i.e. the demand for entrepre-
neurial finance can generate its own supply.  Homophily also implies that having a 
higher level of female entrepreneurship in an economy expands the relatively small 
supply of female venture investment opportunities.   
 
There is much evidence to suggest that females have lower entrepreneurial self-
efficacy and confidence than males so restraining the supply of female entrepre-
neurs (Matthews and Moser 1995, and Kourilsky and Walstad 1998).  If females 
are overly pessimistic about their entrepreneurial ability then this is likely to be 
revealed to those that engage in some form of entrepreneurship.  The resulting up-
ward re-evaluation of self-efficacy/confidence would be expected to have a moder-
ating effect on the findings of Burke et al (2010) where the propensity to become 
an informal business angel was positively affected by experience in entrepreneur-
ship. 
 
Hypothesis 1: The positive impact of entrepreneurial experience on the 
supply of informal venture finance will be stronger for females than for 
males. 
   9 
Females are also viewed as being more risk averse than males (Powell and Ansic 
1997, Jianakoplos and Bernasek, 1998, Grable 2000 and Ackert et al 2002). As a 
result, Becker-Blease and Sohl (2008) find evidence that females gravitate towards 
less risky later stage investment.  But it is also the case that later stage investment 
typically  entails  larger  investment  per  venture  than  more  riskier  early  stage  in-
vestment.  Another possible impact of greater risk aversion among females is the 
tendency to overinvest in (i.e. overfund) ventures in order to reduce the probability 
of cashflow shortages and hence the associated risk of business failure.  Combined, 
these points give us hypothesis 3. 
 
Hypothesis 2: Greater risk aversion among females will reduce their pro-
pensity to become informal venture finance investors but, relative to males, 
increase the amount that they invest.  
 
 
2.1 Prevalence and investment volumes of informal investors 
 
In order to enable an empirical investigation of the determinants of informal in-
vestment volumes and test the associated hypotheses, we use data from the Global 
Entrepreneurship Monitor (GEM). GEM is an international research program that 
provides  harmonised  annual  data  on  national  levels  of  entrepreneurial  activity. 
Each year about 2,000 individuals, drawn randomly from the adult population, are 
being interviewed in an increasing number of countries using a standardised tele-
phone survey. For the present paper we use data collected in the years 2002, 2004 
and 2006
3 for 30 highly developed countries.
4 Since the set-up of the GEM survey 
is the same for each year we can pool the annual data into a single file containing 
338,501 micro-level observations. Among this group 7,762 individuals (2.3%) are 
marked as an informal investor.
5  In the remainder of Section 2 we describe the 
variables used in this study, including their sources. This concerns the dependent 
variables in our estimation model, (i.e. the prevalence of informal investors and 
their investment volumes), as well as predictors that can possibly explain the varia-
tion of these two variables between individuals and across countries (Sections 2.1 
and 2.2). We also provide several descriptive statistics describing prevalence and 
investment volumes of informal investors (Section 2.3).  
 
Dependent variables 
A respondent is defined to be an informal investor if he or she agrees with the fol-
lowing statement: “You have, in the past three years, personally provided funds for 
a new business started by someone else, excluding any purchases of stocks or mu-
tual funds” and, in addition, reported the amount of money they invested in the 
 
3 The initial period under investigation was 2002-2006. Since for the years 2003 and 2005, data on an impor-
tant explanatory variable (viz. Venture Capital Investment (VCI)) were not available, we left these years out 
of the analysis. 
4 Highly developed countries are countries that are categorised as “high-income economies” by the World 
Bank. The reason we only use data for highly developed countries is that the number of observations for the 
lower developed countries is insufficient. In particular, data of several control variables are missing. 
5 The descriptive statistics presented in this section are based on the larger sample of 7,762 informal inves-
tors. When we estimate the econometric model, in Section 4, less observations are used due to missing ob-
servations for several explanatory variables. See Appendix 1 for the distribution of available observations 
and missing values across countries and variables.   10 
past  three  years.
6  The  average  invested  amount  among  all  informal  investors  is 
equal to $30,799. Each informal investor reports the invested amount in the cur-
rency of his or her country. To compute the average invested amount in US$ we 
therefore converted the reported amount to US$ using real exchange rates provided 




2.2 Independent variables 
The group of independent variables used can be split into two categories. The first 
group  of  variables  are  control  variables  containing  demographic  and  structural 
characteristics at both the micro and macro level. The second group of variables 
are explanatory variables and mainly consists of measures of entrepreneurial activ-
ity at the individual and country level. We proceed with an overview and justifica-
tion of all variables included in the analysis. Operationalizations of the variables 
are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
Control variables – micro level 
We control for gender, age, education and household income. Concerning gender, 
women are known to have a lower tendency to become an informal investor, hence 
we control for gender. Concerning age, the supply of informal venture finance is 
likely to be positively related to age as spending more years in the workforce en-
ables greater accumulation of human and financial capital relevant for business an-
gel activity. Greater levels of wealth increase the propensity of individuals to take 
venture finance risks (Burke and Hanley, 2003 and 2006) and hence can increase 
both the prevalence and volume of informal investment. Concerning education, the 
supply of informal venture finance is likely to be positively related to education as 
greater human capital increases the ability and hence performance of informal in-
vestors. Finally, a higher household income increases the financial possibilities to 
make an informal investment. 
 
Control variables – macro level 
We control for real GDP growth and the short-term interest rate. GDP growth is a 
measure of business opportunities and hence is used as a proxy for the demand for 
venture finance. Concerning the short-term interest rate, to the extent that loan fi-
nance is an alternative/substitute for equity finance, one would expect a positive 
relationship between the cost of loan finance (interest rates) and the demand for 
(hence return on) informal investment. However, loan finance is often used as a 
complement  to  equity  finance  –  particularly,  as  gearing  is  a  popular  means  of 
boosting return on investment – and so a higher cost of loan finance may reduce 
the expected returns and hence supply of informal equity finance. 
 
Explanatory variables – micro level 
We use a cohort of variables containing measures of entrepreneurial activity which 
provide insight into an individual’s assessment of the expected return from infor-
mal investment as well as factors that influence an individual’s level of human and 
financial capital relevant for performance as a business angel. In particular, the 
 
6 Respondents indicating to be an informal investor are asked additional questions with regard to the invest-
ment volume. Since not everyone answers these questions, we only count individuals reporting their invest-
ment volume as informal investors. Individuals who indicate they are an informal investor but who do not 
report their invested amount are treated as missing. 
7 See http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/Macroeconomics/Data/HistoricalRealExchangeRatesValues.xls.   11 
variables indicate whether an individual: is the owner-manager of a company; is 
trying to start a new business; has plans to start a business in the near future; is try-
ing to start a new business on behalf of his or her employer; has shut down his or 
her business  in the  past  12 months;  perceives  new business  opportunities;  fears 
failure in case of a business start-up (an indicator of risk aversion); thinks he or 
she has the skills to start a new business; personally knows an entrepreneur. 
 
Furthermore, in the equation explaining the investment volume of informal inves-
tors, we also use the relationship of the informal investor to the investee (family 
member; friend or colleague; stranger) and the informal investor’s expected pay-
off  as  additional  variables.  Investment  in  a  friend  or  family  member’s  business 
might be driven by non-pecuniary factors while one would imagine that investment 
in a business owned by a stranger would be more purely motivated by financial 
gain. Therefore, invesment levels  in  businesses owned  by  strangers  may  be  ex-
pected to be higher. Regarding the expected pay-off, one would expect the average 
size  of  investment  to  be  larger  in  cases  where  the  informal  investor  expects  to 
make a financial gain compared to those where the expectation is that the invest-
ment is effectively a gift or to some extent written off. 
 
Explanatory variables – macro level 
First, we use the percentage of adult population that is either actively involved in 
starting a new business or is the owner-manager of a young business (the so-called 
TEA rate, or total entrepreneurial activity rate). The greater the level of entrepre-
neurial activity the more the demand (opportunities) for informal investment fi-
nance. This is likely to give rise to an increase in the number of informal investors. 
Whether or not it increases the average size of investment made by informal inves-
tors depends on whether incremental changes in TEA comprise ventures above or 
below average size. 
 
Second, we use formal VCI per capita. Venture capital is a typical source of follow 
on (later stage) finance for informal investors who typically provide seed or start-
up finance. To this extent, higher VCI per capita may increase the returns on in-
formal investment and so enhance the supply of informal finance. But a proportion 
of the VC industry competes with informal investors for investment opportunities 
in early stage investment. This proportion usually rises when there are high levels 
of VC funds (competition among later stage VCs forces some of them to migrate to 
early stage). This causes greater competition for early stage investment opportuni-
ties and so reduces the returns on and supply of informal venture finance. 
 
 
2.3 Descriptive statistics 
We will now present several descriptive statistics that provide insight into the dis-
tribution of informal investors, across several dimensions, as well as the amounts 
invested. These statistics are based on the group of 7,762 informal investors identi-
fied earlier. For some statistics this number is smaller due to missing observations 
on  the  dimension  variable.  The  descriptive  statistics  will  also  be  provided  for 
males and females separately. Within the sample of males, the dataset identifies 
4,700 informal investors, corresponding to 3.0% of the male adult population. In 
the sample of females, 3,062 (1.7%) informal investors are identified. 
 
Gender   12 
Table 1 shows the distribution of informal investors by gender. Most informal in-
vestors are men. Their average investment volume is twice that of women.  
 
Table 1 Distribution of informal investors and amount invested by gender (N=7,762) 
Gender  Percentage of informal investors  Average invested amount (US$) 
Male  61  38,199 
Female  39  19,440 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
Invested amounts 
Figure 1 reveals that, over a three-year period, most informal investors invest an 
amount of money up to 1,000 US$ (35%). About a quarter invests between 1,000 
and 10,000 US$, while 34% invests between 10,000 and 100,000 US$. Only 6% of 















up to 1,000 US$ 1,000-10,000 US$ 10,000-100,000 US$ more than 100,000 US$
 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
When focusing on males and females separately, Figure 2 shows that the distribu-
tion of investment volumes of male and female informal investors is quite differ-
ent. While 31% of the males invest an amount up to 1,000 US$, 42% of the fe-
males invest a similar amount. About a quarter of both males and females invests 
between 1,000 and 10,000 US$, but substantially more males invest an amount 
higher than 10,000 US$ (44% of males versus 32% of females).  
 
 
8 For 30 observations (out of 7792) the informal investment volume exceeds $2 million US$. We do not con-
sider the nature of these huge investments informal. We excluded these outlier observations from the analy-
sis.   13 
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Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
Age 
Table 2 shows the distribution of the total sample of informal investors by age. 
The vast majority of informal investors is between 25 and 64 years of age (82%). 
The remaining two categories “18 to 24 years” and “65 years or older” mainly con-
sist  of  students  and  retired  persons  respectively.  When  looking  at  the  average 
amount  invested  (in  US$)  by  age  category,  it  follows  that  the  average  invested 
amount increases with the respondent’s age. Young people (those younger than 35 
years  of  age)  make  considerably  smaller  investment  than  people  older  than  35 
years. 
 
Table 2 Age distribution of informal investor prevalence and amount invested, total sam-
ple (N=7,331) 
Age in 6 categories  Percentage of informal investors  Average invested amount (US$) 
18 to 24 years  10  14,000 
25 to 34 years  16  19,000 
35 to 44 years  27  33,000 
45 to 54 years  23  38,000 
55 to 64 years  16  39,000 
65 years or older  8  35,000 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
The age distributions for male and female informal investors separately, are dis-
played in Figure 3A and Figure 3B. Interestingly, this shows that the relative age 
distribution is similar for males and females. As for the total sample, the vast ma-
jority of informal investors is between 25 to 64 years of age. The difference be-
tween men and women concerns the amount they invest informally: males’ average 
investment volume is twice that of females. Apart from the amount itself, the dis-
tribution by age category also varies. For males we clearly observe an increasing 
pattern (except for the oldest category) while for females the variation of invest-
ment volumes over the various age categories is not so large. 
   14 
Figure 3A   Distribution of male informal investors (%) and average amount invested (US$) 
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Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
Figure 3B   Distribution of female informal investors (%) and average amount invested 
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Table 3 shows the distribution of the total sample of informal investors by educa-
tion. Almost two-fifth (38%)  of the  informal  investors  are  highly  educated  (i.e. 
completed post-secondary education and/or has graduate experience). The remain-  15 
ing two groups of low- and medium-educated informal investors account for 30% 
and 32% respectively. Highly educated investors generally invest more ($46,000 
on  average)  than  informal  investors  with  a  low  or  medium  level  of  education 
($20,000 resp. $23,000).  
 
Table 3 Distribution of informal investors (%) and average amount invested (US$) by level 
of education, total sample (N=7,607) 
Education in 3 categories  Percentage of informal investors  Average invested amount (US$) 
Low  30  19,512 
Medium  32  23,209 
High  38  46,186 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
Figure 4 shows how education is related to the decision to informally invest for 
male and female informal investors separately. There is not much difference be-
tween the distribution of informal investors by level of education for males and 
females. Informal investment activity increases by level of education. This pattern 
also holds for the average invested amount. As education increases, male and fe-
male informal investors invest a larger amount. Highly educated male investors 
however, invest more than twice the amount medium-educated males invest. For 
female investors, the average invested amount increases more gradually with edu-
cation. 
 
Figure 4   Distribution of male and female informal investors (%) and average amount in-
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% of informal investors [left axis] Average invested amount [right axis]
 




Relationship with investee 
Table 4 shows that more than 50% of the informal investors invests in the com-
pany of a family member. In addition, a substantial group (37%) invests in compa-
nies of friends and working colleagues and only 9% of the informal investors in-  16 
vests in firms of strangers. However, firms of strangers receive much more money: 
with an average amount of almost $80,000 the amount invested in firms of strang-
ers  is  more  than  twice  the  amount  invested  in  firms  of  family  members  or 
friends/colleagues. 
 
Table 4 Distribution of informal investors (%) and average amount invested (US$) by type 
of relationship with the investee, total sample (N=5,464) 
Relationship with investee  Percentage of informal investors  Average invested amount (US$) 
Family member  54  36,608 
Friend or colleague  37  36,469 
Stranger  9  79,472 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
The distribution of informal investors and the amount invested by males and fe-
males  separately  is  illustrated  in  Figure  5.  This  shows  some  remarkable  differ-
ences.  The  most  striking  difference  is  that  male  investors  invest  more  often  in 
firms owned by strangers (11% of males versus 6% of females) and their average 
invested amount is almost four times the average amount invested by female inves-
tors ($97,000 of males versus $25,000 of females). Females, on the other hand, in-
vest substantially more often in businesses of family members. Close to 70% of 
female investors provide finance for a business of a family member whereas this is 
about 46% for males. Investment levels in firms of a friend or colleague are similar 
for males and females, although males invest more often in these businesses. 
 
Figure 5   Distribution of male and female informal investors (%) and amount invested 


































































































% of informal investors [left axis] Average invested amount [right axis]
 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
 
The expected pay-off 
We will now take a closer look at the amount of money the informal investor ex-
pects to receive back (i.e. returns on investment). It follows from Table 5 that al-
most 40% of the informal investors expect to receive more money back than they   17 
invested (positive return on investment), whereas 35% does not expect any money 
back at all. One fourth of the informal investors expects to receive back a part of 
the amount invested or about as much. Although there does not seem to be a clear 
relationship between the expected pay-off and an individual’s decision to become 
an informal investor, Table 5 does suggest a positive relation between the expected 
pay-off and the amount invested. Especially when the investor expects to receive 
more than the invested amount back, investment volumes of informal investors in-
crease radically.  
 
Table 5 Distribution of informal investors (%) and amount invested (US$) by expected return 
on investment (N=3,524) 
Expected pay-off  Percentage of informal investors  Average invested amount (US$) 
None  35  27,662 
Invested amount or a part of it  26  38,001 
More than invested amount  39  60,202 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
Focusing on male and female investors separately, Figure 6 suggests that female 
investors seem to be more altruistic, or at least more strongly influenced by non-
pecuniary motives (e.g. Burke et al, 2000), than male investors in the sense that 
68% of the female investors expect none or only a part of their invested amount 
back versus 57% of the male investors. This is probably strongly related to the in-
formal investor’s relationship with the investee. As we have seen, women invest 
more frequently in a firm of a family member (associated with a non-pecuniary in-
vesment motive) whereas men relatively more often provide funds for a stranger’s 
business (associated with a pecuniary motive).  
 
Figure 6   Distribution of male and female informal investors (%) and average amount in-








































































































% of informal investors [left axis] Average invested amount [right axis]
 
Source: Global Entrepreneurship Monitor 
 
 
3. Estimation methods   18 
In this paper we use two different estimation techniques. First, for the model ex-
plaining an individual’s decision to become an informal investor, we use a probit 
model, where the dependent variable indicates whether the individual is an infor-
mal investor or not. Second, for the model explaining the (natural logarithm of the) 
investment volume we use ordinary least squares (OLS). This model is estimated 
using the sample of informal investors only. 
 
Importantly, it is possible that sample selection occurs, i.e., it is possible that the 
correlation between the error terms of the two models is not equal to zero. In that 
case the OLS results for the investment volume model would be biased, and esti-
mation of a Heckman selection model would be appropriate. This type of model 
corrects for the correlation between the two error terms (Heckman, 1979). How-
ever, if the correlation is not significant, estimation of the Heckman model is actu-
ally less robust than using plain OLS.  
 
In the Heckman model the so-called Inverse Mills ratio indicates whether or not 
the correlation between the error terms is significant, i.e. whether it is necessary to 
use the Heckman model or whether plain OLS would provide more robust results 
for the investment volume model. We estimated a Heckman specification for each 
of the variants discussed in this paper, and found that the Inverse Mills ratio was 
never significantly different from zero. Since this indicates absence of the sample 
selection problem, we used OLS to estimate the investment volume equation. 
 
 
4. Estimation results 
Estimation results are presented in Table 6.
9  In the estimation of the first equation, 
explaining the prevalence of informal investors, 126,189 observations (i.e. indi-
viduals drawn from the adult population) are used. In the second equation, explain-
ing the investment volumes, 1,349 observations are used (i.e. only the informal in-
vestors).
10   
 
Explanatory variables 
Table 6 shows that involvement in entrepreneurial activity strongly increases the 
probability of becoming an informal investor as all individual measures of entre-
preneurial activity, except for business start-up and fear of failure, are positively 
significant in the probit model. Not surprisingly  given the high risks associated 
with informal investment, individuals who fear failure, if they were to start a busi-
ness, are less likely to become an informal investor. With regard to the investment 
volumes we observe that informal investors who currently own a business invest 
more than those that do not, indicating that the human and financial capital accu-
mulation from being an entrepreneur enables greater ability and willingness to in-
vest more as an informal investor. Similarly, those who believe that they have the 
required knowledge, skills and experience for starting a business, on average in-
vest more, ceteris paribus. In essence these findings reflect Theorem 1.  They point 
 
9 We checked that multicollinearity is not an issue, as correlations between independent variables are rather 
low. 
10 Due to missing values for several model variables (explanatory variables and control variables) the number 
of observations for the regression analysis is considerably smaller than for the descriptive analysis. In Ap-
pendix 1 we show how the observations are distributed over the countries, both for the descriptive statistics 
and for the estimation sample. We also show the number of available observations for each model variable. 
These overviews provide insight how the available observations (and hence also the missing values) are dis-
tributed over the countries and variables.    19 
to a positive synergy between entrepreneurship and informal investment level in 
that both the skills and finance required for business angel activity can be gener-
ated by involvement in entrepreneurship. In short, involvement in entrepreneurial 
activity –whether ongoing or having resulted in exit– significantly increases an in-
dividual’s  probability  of  becoming  an  informal  investor  and,  for  two  specific 
measures, also the amount of money invested.   
 
Concerning the macro level variables – VCI per capita and the TEA rate – we also 
find interesting results. A high TEA rate significantly increases the probability of 
becoming an informal investor. Hence, the demand for informal investment (indi-
cated by the extent of entrepreneurial activity at the macro level) to some extent 
creates its own supply (see also Burke et al., 2010). However, the investment vol-
umes of  individual informal  investors  decrease  with macro-level  entrepreneurial 
activity (although this effect is only significant at the 10% level). The net effect is 
positive and we discuss this estimate later in the paper.  
 
Venture Capital Investment (VCI) per capita is significant for both the prevalence 
of informal investors (positive sign) and the amount invested (negative sign; only 
significant at 10% level). The positive coefficient in the equation explaining in-
formal investor prevalence confirms earlier research which suggests that VCI and 
informal  investment  activities to some  extent  are  complementary  in  that VC fi-
nance  provides  follow  on  finance  for  businesses  funded  by  informal  investors 
(Burke et al., 2010). However, for the informal investment volume, we observe a 
negative coefficient. This appears to reveal the competitive nature between these 
two sources of finance. Namely, higher VCI per capita (i.e. a bigger formal VC 
market)  is  often  associated  with  greater  seed  and  early  stage  VC  investment 
(Gompers and Lerner, 1999) which means that venture capitalists will be in greater 
competition with informal investors who place most of their investment in early 
stage ventures. Alternatively, if there is little follow on VC finance available, then 




Concerning the micro-level control variables, we account for gender, age, educa-
tion,  and  household  income.  The  descriptive  statistics  suggested  that  males  are 
more likely to be an informal investor and their average amount invested is higher 
than that of females. This is supported by the regression results as the dummy for 
male respondents is significantly positive in both equations. As far as age is con-
cerned, we find that people aged 35 years and older have a significantly higher 
probability  of  becoming  an  informal  investor  than  people  aged  between  18-34 
years. Individuals in the age category 45-54 years seem to be most likely to invest 
in a business owned by someone else. Human and financial capital accumulated 
across the lifespan of a career appear to cause more informal investment activity. 
The increasing pattern in the age dummy coefficients in the second equation shows 
that investment volumes of informal investors increase with age.
11 Regarding edu-
cation, Table 6 shows that higher educated individuals have a higher probability of 
becoming informal investors and on average also invest more compared to lower-
educated individuals – again consistent with the importance of human capital for 
business  angel  activity.  Regarding  household  income,  we  find  that  individuals 
 
11 Note that Table 6 does not include coefficients for the highest age category (65 years or older). After remo-
ving missing observations, it turned out there were no observations left in this category.   20 
from a wealthier household are more often informal investor, as expected. Some-
what surprising, individuals with lower incomes more often invest than individuals 
with medium incomes. This pattern may be a result of a higher propensity to take 
risk among entrepreneurial people at the tails of the wealth distribution (Burke and 
Hanley, 2003 and 2006).  
 
As far as the control variables at the macro level are concerned, we find that the 
probability of becoming an informal investor is positively related to GDP growth. 
However, for the average invested amount we find a negative sign (only significant 
at 10% level). These results cannot be interpreted without a high degree of specu-
lation.  One  possible  explanation  is  that  higher  GDP  growth  raises  wealth  and 
causes an increase in the supply of informal investors who at the margin may be 
smaller scale investors, thereby reducing the average investment size per investor. 
 
The short-term interest rate is positively related to informal investor prevalence, 
but  negatively  to  investment  volumes.  We  think  that  the  positive  effect  on  the 
prevalence of informal investors is likely to be due to a substitution effect where a 
higher cost of loan finance for ventures increases the demand (opportunities) for 
equity finance. However, the higher cost of loan finance appears to cause the level 
of investment per informal investor to decline. In other words, since high gearing 
increases  the  rate  of  return  on  equity  venture  finance,  higher  interest  rates  in-
creases the cost of gearing and hence limits the upside potential and optimal size 
of informal investment. 
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Table 6  Results total sample 
  Prevalence of informal in-
vestors (probit model) 
  Investment volume  
(linear regression model) 
Estimation method  Maximum likelihood    Ordinary Least Squares 
Effective sample  126,189    1,349 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept 
Explanatory variables 
-7.433**  0.329    8.500**  1.128 
Entrepreneurial activity           
Owner-manager  0.309**  0.054    0.543*  0.275 
Business start-up  0.088  0.074    -0.334  0.326 
Future business start-up  0.359**  0.036    0.114  0.151 
Bus. start-up for employer  0.201**  0.074    -0.053  0.339 
Business shutdown  0.668**  0.055    0.092  0.226 
New business opportunities   0.138**  0.023    0.053  0.108 
Fear of failure  -0.055*  0.023    0.064  0.110 
Skills to start new business  0.167**  0.023    0.281*  0.117 
Knows entrepreneurs  0.512**  0.023    0.175  0.127 
Relationship to investee           
Friend or family member 
(base category)     
     
Stranger  n.a.  n.a.    -0.414  0.252 
Expected pay-off           
None (base category)           
Partly or about as much  n.a.  n.a.    0.098  0.160 
More than invested  n.a.  n.a.    0.492**  0.159 
Unknown  n.a.  n.a.    0.120  0.278 
Macro level           
TEA rate (total)  0.304**  0.019    -0.145  0.080 
VCI per capita  11.479**  0.980    -6.107  3.629 
           
Control variables           
Gender           
Female (base category)           
Male  0.087**  0.022    0.333**  0.107 
Age           
18 to 24 years (base category)           
25 to 34 years  0.021  0.040    0.836**  0.218 
35 to 44 years  0.120**  0.036    1.127**  0.204 
45 to 54 years  0.141**  0.037    1.465**  0.211 
55 to 64 years  0.120**  0.039    1.619**  0.215 
Education           
Low (base category)           
Medium  -0.007  0.028    -0.129  0.141 
High  0.095**  0.029    0.210  0.127 
Household income           
Low (base category)           
Medium  -0.085*  0.034    -0.120  0.170 
High  0.075*  0.034    0.147  0.153 
Macro level           
GDP growth  0.239**  0.064    -0.257  0.135 
Short-term interest rate  0.218**  0.045    -0.457**  0.140 
Note: * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level.  
Country and year dummies are included in both equations but are not reported.   22 
 
 
Differences between determinants of male and female informal investment 
The literature indicates that female entrepreneurs frequently face difficulties get-
ting (informal) finance for their business. Males dominate both entrepreneur and 
informal investor populations. Therefore, it is important to investigate gender vari-
ances in the determinants of the level of informal venture finance investment.  In 
this regard, in Section 2 we have derived two testable hypotheses relating to gen-
der.    Also  since  women’s  businesses  are  more  likely  to  be  in  industries  where 
males are less likely to operate, female entrepreneurs are sometimes ignored in in-
formal investment finance by male investors. In order to investigate the determi-
nants of male and female informal investors and their investment volumes sepa-
rately, we estimate our model separately for males and females. The estimation re-
sults are presented in Table 7 and Table 8.  
 
There are two main differences in the estimation results between male and female 
investors. The positive effect of owning a business on the investment volume turns 
out to primarily apply to female informal investors (Table 8). While the positive 
effect of self-assessed entrepreneurial skills on the investment volume turns out to 
primarily apply to male informal investors (Table 7). This result supports hypothe-
sis  1  which  states  that  the  positive  impact  of  entrepreneurial  experience  on  the 
supply of informal venture investment finance will be stronger for females than 
males. Table 8 also reveals a significantly positive impact of female’s fear of fail-
ure on their investment volume. In other words, if an informal investor fears fail-
ure for starting her own business, she is likely to invest a larger sum of money in 
someone else’s business (mainly businesses owned by a family member). This re-
sult  provides  support  for hypothesis  2 that  greater  risk  aversion among  females 
will reduce their propensity to become informal venture finance investors but in-
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Table 7  Results males 
  Prevalence of informal in-
vestors (probit model) 
  Investment volume  
(linear regression model) 
Estimation method  Maximum likelihood    Ordinary Least Squares 
Effective sample  58,008    800 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept 
Explanatory variables 
-7.202**  0.402    8.910**  1.527 
Entrepreneurial activity           
Owner-manager  0.273**  0.071    0.059  0.337 
Business start-up  0.186*  0.092    -0.168  0.399 
Future business start-up  0.364**  0.045    0.136  0.190 
Bus. start-up for employer  0.158  0.090    -0.131  0.407 
Business shutdown  0.651**  0.070    0.056  0.276 
New business opportunities   0.119**  0.030    0.196  0.133 
Fear of failure  -0.055  0.031    -0.145  0.142 
Skills to start new business  0.137**  0.030    0.327*  0.146 
Knows entrepreneurs  0.488**  0.030    0.228  0.177 
Relationship to investee           
Friend or family member 
(base category)     
     
Stranger  n.a.  n.a.    -0.264  0.317 
Expected pay-off           
None (base category)           
Partly or about as much  n.a.  n.a.    -0.044  0.210 
More than invested  n.a.  n.a.    0.520**  0.184 
Unknown  n.a.  n.a.    0.501  0.340 
Macro level           
TEA rate (male)  0.277**  0.024    -0.135  0.102 
VCI per capita  8.718**  1.187    -7.977  4.296 
           
Control variables           
Age           
18 to 24 years (base category)           
25 to 34 years  0.057  0.051    0.517*  0.259 
35 to 44 years  0.125**  0.047    1.058**  0.239 
45 to 54 years  0.128**  0.049    1.222**  0.257 
55 to 64 years  0.088  0.051    1.550**  0.259 
Education           
Low (base category)           
Medium  -0.020  0.039    -0.353  0.182 
High  0.091*  0.039    0.094  0.158 
Household income           
Low (base category)           
Medium  -0.142**  0.047    -0.169  0.212 
High  0.050  0.046    0.075  0.179 
Macro level           
GDP growth  0.143  0.074    0.056  0.166 
Short-term interest rate  0.122*  0.060    -0.436*  0.192 
Note: * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level. 
Country and year dummies are included in both equations but are not reported. 
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Table 8  Results females 
  Prevalence of informal in-
vestors (probit model) 
  Investment volume  
(linear regression model) 
Estimation method  Maximum likelihood    Ordinary Least Squares 
Effective sample  68,181    549 
  Coefficient  Std. error    Coefficient  Std. error 
Intercept 
Explanatory variables 
         
Entrepreneurial activity           
Owner-manager  0.369**  0.083    1.200**  0.443 
Business start-up  -0.098  0.128    -0.739  0.544 
Future business start-up  0.340**  0.060    0.135  0.265 
Bus. start-up for employer  0.307*  0.130    -0.002  0.668 
Business shutdown  0.698**  0.087    0.198  0.360 
New business opportunities   0.171**  0.036    -0.119  0.182 
Fear of failure  -0.058  0.034    0.355*  0.171 
Skills to start new business  0.213**  0.034    0.152  0.195 
Knows entrepreneurs  0.540**  0.035    0.084  0.197 
Relationship to investee           
Friend or family member 
(base category)     
     
Stranger  n.a.  n.a.    -0.712  0.398 
Expected pay-off           
None (base category)           
Partly or about as much  n.a.  n.a.    0.285  0.250 
More than invested  n.a.  n.a.    0.473  0.297 
Unknown  n.a.  n.a.    -0.313  0.463 
Macro level           
TEA rate (female)  0.294**  0.026    -0.109  0.109 
VCI per capita  15.059**  1.636    -4.423  6.686 
           
Control variables           
Age           
18 to 24 years (base category)           
25 to 34 years  -0.024  0.063    1.547**  0.373 
35 to 44 years  0.113*  0.056    1.503**  0.363 
45 to 54 years  0.155**  0.057    2.004**  0.356 
55 to 64 years  0.163**  0.060    2.059**  0.367 
Education           
Low (base category)           
Medium  0.010  0.041    0.219  0.233 
High  0.095*  0.044    0.414  0.222 
Household income           
Low (base category)           
Medium  -0.001  0.050    0.042  0.272 
High  0.125*  0.054    0.276  0.273 
Macro level           
GDP growth  0.359**  0.104    -0.795**  0.217 
Short-term interest rate  0.323**  0.066    -0.538*  0.211 
Note: * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level. 
Country and year dummies are included in both equations but are not reported. 
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4.1 Elasticities 
The estimation results from Table 6 enable us to shed light on effects of macro-
economic variables on the total supply of informal investment in a country. This 
can be seen as follows. From the first equation the effect of changes in macro-
economic variables on the probability of any adult becoming an informal investor 
can be computed. At the macro level, these changes in probability translate into 
changes in the number of informal investors. From the second equation the effect 
on average invested amounts can be computed. Combined, these two effects pro-
vide  the  effect  on  the  total  supply  of  informal  investment,  which  is  simply  the 
number of informal investors multiplied by the average amount invested per inves-
tor.  
 
In this section we compute elasticities of the prevalence and the investment vol-
umes of informal investors, both with respect to VCI per capita and the TEA rate. 
From these elasticities, the elasticity of the total supply of informal investment fol-
lows as well. These elasticities, relating to Theorems 2 and 3, are computed at the 
mean values of the macroeconomic variables and are shown in Table 9.
12 
 
Table 9 Elasticities of macroeconomic variables, total sample 
  Prevalence of in-
formal investors  
Investment volume 
per informal investor 
Total supply of in-
formal investment 
VCI per capita  0.582  -0.315  0.265 
TEA rate (total)  1.702  -0.827  0.861 
 
 
A change in any of these macro-level variables affects both the probability of be-
coming an informal investor and the average amount of investment per investor. 
The combined effect is the effect on the total level of investment of all informal 
investors in a country. We see that a one per cent change in VCI per capita in-
creases the probability of becoming an informal investor (at the macro level: the 
number of informal investors) by 0.582 per cent. However, the average amount in-
vested decreases by 0.315 per cent. The net effect of a one per cent change in VCI 
per capita on the total supply of informal investment is therefore 0.265 per cent.
13  
Hence, in economies with a strong formal VC market, the supply of informal in-
vestors increases and this increase is bigger than the decline in average invested 
amount. As a net result, the size of the total informal investment market (in terms 
of monetary value) increases. 
 
Perhaps the more striking results are those for total entrepreneurial activity (TEA). 
A one per cent increase in entrepreneurial activity increases the number of infor-
mal investors by 1.702 per cent. However, the average invested amount declines by 
0.827 per cent leading to a net positive total increase by 0.861 per cent. This result 
indicates that, to a considerable extent, demand for informal investment (reflected 
by TEA) creates its own supply. 
 
 
12 For the prevalence of informal investors (first column), the elasticities (elas) are computed as follows: elas 
= beta*(1-p)*x_ave, where beta is the estimated coefficient from the probit equation, p is the sample average 
of the dependent variable (i.e. the share of informal investors in the sample), and x_ave is the sample aver-
age of the independent variable under consideration. For the average investment volume (second column), 
the elasticities (elas) are computed as follows: elas = beta*x_ave (note that the dependent variable is ex-
pressed in logs). Please note that the elasticity formulas are different for probit and OLS models. 
13 This is computed as follows: 100*(1+0.00582)*(1-0.00315)-100=0.265.   26 
Differences between the elasticities for males and females 
Table 10 and 11 present the elasticities of the macroeconomic variables for males 
and females separately. Interestingly, VCI per capita has a much larger positive net 
effect on females than males with elasticities of 0.541 and 0.027 per cent respec-
tively. This may be due to the fact that when VCI levels are high, competition 
among traditional (male dominated) VCI funds forces VC finance into more female 
ventures and hence due to homophily gender bias has a stronger net complemen-
tary effect on female informal investors.  
 
 
Table 10 Elasticities of macroeconomic variables, males 
  Prevalence of in-
formal investors  
Investment volume 
per informal investor 
Total supply of in-
formal investment 
VCI per capita  0.436  -0.407  0.027 
TEA rate (male)  2.045  -1.015  1.010 
 
 
Table 11 Elasticities of macroeconomic variables, females 
  Prevalence of in-
formal investors  
Investment volume 
per informal investor 
Total supply of in-
formal investment 
VCI per capita  0.774  -0.231  0.541 
TEA rate (female)  1.095  -0.413  0.678 
 
 
The macro-level effect of a one per cent increase in total entrepreneurial activity 
(TEA) on the total supply of informal investment is smaller for women (0.678 per 
cent) than for men (1.01 per cent). This result could also be reflective of homo-
phily gender bias and the finding that females have a lower tendency to become in-
formal  investors  than  males.  Hence,  if  the  demand  for  informal  investment  by 
women increases due to increased entrepreneurial activity, then there is lower re-
sponse from (female) investors to accommodate this increased demand, compared 
to an increase in male entrepreneurial activity.  This effect is evident in tables 10 
and  11  where  the  elasticity  relating  to  the  prevalence  of  informal  investors  for 
women is roughly half of that for men.  
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5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we address the question, what determines the volume of informal venture 
finance investment and does it vary by gender?  We estimate a two-equation model 
enabling us to jointly investigate the determinants of both the prevalence and the 
investment volumes of informal investors. Our models use GEM data on 126,189 
individuals in 21 highly developed countries in the period 2002-2006. 
 
We delve deeper into the finding of Burke et al (2010) that ‘the demand for informal 
venture finance tends to generate its own supply’.  We find that a one per cent increase 
in entrepreneurial activity increases the number of informal investors by 1.702 per 
cent. However, the average invested amount declines by 0.827 per cent leading to a 
net positive total increase by 0.861 per cent. This result indicates that, to a consid-
erable extent, demand for informal investment creates its own supply. This net ef-
fect is stronger for males (1.01 per cent) than females (0.678 per cent) which we 
believe is due to investor homophily gender bias combined with the finding that 
females have a lower tendency to become informal investors than males.  We also 
find that the level of venture capital investment has a net positive effect on the lev-
el of informal investment and that this effect is stronger for females than males. 
 
In addition, we also propose and test two micro level hypotheses.  The first is that 
the positive impact of entrepreneurial experience on the supply of informal venture 
finance will be stronger for females than males.  This hypothesis is based on the 
notion that female entrepreneurs have less entrepreneurial self-efficacy and confi-
dence than males and hence experience in entrepreneurship is likely to have a more 
positive moderating effect on this than for males.  The evidence supports this as 
we find that the positive effect of owning a business on informal investment vol-
ume primarily applies to female informal investors.  We also find corroborating as-
sociated evidence supporting the notion that males have higher confidence levels 
than females. In particular, we find that a positive effect of self-assessed entrepre-
neurial skills on investment volume primarily applies to males. 
 
Second, we proposed and tested the hypothesis that greater risk aversion among 
females will reduce their propensity to become informal venture finance investors 
but, relative to males, increase the amount that they invest.  We found supportive 
evidence as ‘fear of failure’ had a unique positive effect on investment volumes for 
females. 
 
Finally, we also found evidence indicating that female informal venture finance 
investors were less influenced by pecuniary motivation than men as we discovered 
that  investment  volumes  being  positively  driven  by  a  high  expected  pay-off  is 
purely a male characteristic. 
 
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to directly estimate the determinants of the total 
volume of informal venture finance investment.  Our focus on gender appears justified 
given the heterogeneity  uncovered between males and females regarding the factors 
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Appendix 1: Data availability by country and variable 
 
Due to missing values for several model variables (explanatory variables and con-
trol variables) the number of observations for the regression analysis is considera-
bly smaller than for the descriptive analysis. In this appendix we show how the ob-
servations are distributed over the countries, both for the descriptive statistics and 
for the estimation sample (Table A1). We also show the number of available ob-
servations for each model variable (Table A2). These overviews provide insight 
how the available observations (and hence also the missing values) are distributed 




Table A1 Distribution of observations across countries 




investors     # observations 
# informal 
investors 
Spain  47,155  1,169    25,386  298 
Germany  26,284  577    10,290  204 
United Kingdom  82,773  682    27,457  166 
Sweden  30,457  411    22,519  153 
United States  9,511  347    5,196  115 
Denmark  13,961  303    6,974  80 
Norway  6,843  214    2,083  45 
Belgium  9,845  105    3,733  39 
Ireland  5,943  102    2,310  31 
Australia  7,855  146    2,097  30 
Netherlands  10,512  98    3,050  29 
Finland  5,961  94    1,567  28 
France  5,799  104    2,980  26 
Switzerland  1,987  59    1,016  25 
Hungary  7,356  88    2,503  24 
Italy  6,870  2,021    2,596  22 
Greece  3,973  72    1,151  13 
Canada  5,977  108    989  10 
Iceland  5,779  211    954  6 
New Zealand  3,844  82    153  3 
Japan  5,890  8    1,185  2 
Singapore  9,830  260    0  0 
Korea  2,005  87    0  0 
Portugal  997  6    0  0 
Slovenia  6,992  76    0  0 
Czech Republic  1,983  92    0  0 
Hong Kong  3,993  87    0  0 
Chinese Taipei  2,222  67    0  0 
United Arab 
Emirates  1,986  42    0  0 
Israel  3,918  44     0  0 
Total  338,501  7,762     126,189  1,349 
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Table A2 Data availability by variable 
  # observations 
corresponding to  
# informal investors 
Prevalence of informal investors / Invested volume  338,501  7,762 
Explanatory variables     
Entrepreneurial activity     
Owner-manager  338,501  7,762 
Business start-up  338,501  7,762 
Future business start-up  188,788  3,228 
Business start-up for employer  338,501  7,762 
Business shutdown  338,213  7,750 
New business opportunities   212,442  4,841 
Fear of failure  245,869  5,545 
Skills to start new business  246,152  5,504 
Knows entrepreneurs  251,405  5,635 
Informal investment activity     
Relationship to investee  .  5,464 
Expected pay-off  .  7,762 
Macro level     
TEA rate  338,501  7,762 
VCI per capita  301,492  6,863 
     
Control variables     
Micro level     
Gender  338,501  7,762 
Age  320,041  7,331 
Education  332,289  7,607 
Household income
1  338,501  7,762 
Macro level     
GDP growth  338,501  7,762 
Short-term interest rate  311,725  7,186 
1 Missing values imputed. 
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Appendix 2: Operationalizations of model variables 
 
This appendix provides definitions and sources for the variables used in our paper. 
 
Control variables – micro level 
Gender  Dummy variable indicating the respondent’s gender 
(1=male) 
 
Age in 6 categories 
(dummy variables) 
Age of the respondent in 6 (dummy) categories: 
1. 18-24 years 
2. 25-34 years 
3. 35-44 years 
4. 45-54 years 
5. 55-64 years 
6. 65 years or older 
 
Education in 3 cat-
egories 
Education of the respondent in three (dummy) categories: 
1. low (summation of GEM’s classifications ‘no education’ 
and ‘some secondary education’) 
2. medium (GEM’s ‘secondary education’ classification) 
3. high (GEM’s classifications ‘post-secondary education’ 
and ‘graduate experience’) 
 
Household income 
in 3 categories 
Household income in three (dummy) categories:  
1. low; 2. medium 3. high 
These dummies indicate whether the household income of 
the respondent belongs to the lowest, middle or upper 33% 




Control variables – macro level 
Real GDP growth  The annual percent change in real GDP. We use data pro-





Interest  rate  on  loan  contracts  or  debt  instruments,  taken 




Explanatory variables – micro level 
Owner-manager  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  respondent  is  cur-
rently the owner-manager of a company. The dummy takes 
the value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement “you 
are, alone or with others, currently the owner of a company 
you  help  manage,  self-employed,  or  selling  any  goods  or 
services to others”. 
Business start-up  Dummy  variable  indicating  whether  the  respondent  is  cur-
 
14 Missing values are replaced by an imputation procedure in STATA, based on all variables in the regression 
model.   34 
rently trying to start a new business. The dummy takes the 
value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement “you are, 
alone or with others, currently trying to start a new business, 
including any self-employment or selling any goods or ser-
vices to others”. 
Future business 
start-up 
Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has plans 
to start a business in the next three years. The dummy takes 
the value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement “you 
are, alone or with others, expecting to start a new business, 




Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent is trying 
to start a new business on behalf of his or her employer. The 
dummy takes the value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the 
statement “you are, alone or with others, currently trying to 
start a new business or a new venture for your employer as 
part of your normal work”. 
Business shut-down  Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has shut 
down his or her business in the past 12 months. The dummy 
takes the value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement 
“you have, in the past 12 months, sold, shut down, discon-
tinued or quit a business you owned and managed, any form 
of self-employment, or goods or services to anyone”. 
New business op-
portunities  
Dummy  variable indicating  the  respondent’s perceived op-
portunities. The dummy is assigned the value ‘1’ if the re-
spondent  agreed  to  the  statement  “in  the  next  six  months 
there will be good opportunities for starting a business in the 
area where you live”. 
Fear of failure  Dummy variable indicating the respondent’s fear of failure 
and hence providing a good indicator of risk aversion. The 
dummy is assigned the value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to 
the statement “fear of failure would prevent you from start-
ing a new business”. 
Skills to start new 
business 
Dummy  variable  indicating  the  respondent’s  perceived  ca-
pabilities for starting a business. The dummy is assigned the 
value ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement “you have 




Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent person-
ally knows an entrepreneur. The dummy is assigned the val-
ue ‘1’ if the respondent agreed to the statement “you know 
someone personally who started a business in the past two 
years”. 
Relationship to in-
vestee in 3 catego-
ries 
Relationship of the informal investor to the investee in three 
(dummy) categories. 
1. Family member 
2. Friend or colleague 
3. Stranger or someone else 
 
Pay-off in 4 catego-
ries 
The informal investor’s expected pay-off in 4 (dummy) cat-
egories: 
1. None: the informal investor does not expect to receive any   35 
money back from the investment. 
2. Less or equal to the amount invested: the informal inves-
tor expects to receive a part of the amount invested or about 
as much. 
3. More than invested amount: the informal investor expects 
to receive more money than invested. 





Explanatory variables – macro level 
TEA rate  The TEA rate is defined as the percentage of the adult popu-
lation (18-64 years of age) that is either actively involved in 
starting a new business (nascent entrepreneur) or is the own-
er-manager  of  a  business  that  is  less  than  42  months  old 
(young  business  owner).  The  TEA  rate  is  taken  from  the 
GEM database. 
 
VCI per capita  Venture  Capital  Investment  (VCI)  per  capita  measures  a 
country’s  classic  venture  capital  invested  domestically  in 
thousands  of  US$  divided  by  a  country’s  population  size. 
VCI data have been taken from the so-called “financing da-





15 The fourth category is added because the number of missing values for the pay-off variable is high. In par-
ticular, the variable is not observed for the year 2002. The dummy for the fourth category indicates whether 
the expected pay-off is observed or not. 
16 More specifically, data for venture capital investment are taken from the data sets provided in the “GEM 
Members Area”. For the year 2002 we have taken the variable labeled “Domestic $US (1,000): total classic” 
from the National Venture Capital Data reported in 2003. For the year 2004 we have taken the variable la-
beled “Classic VC invested domestically $US (1,000)” from the financing dataset of 2004. For the year 2006 
we have taken the variable labeled “Classic VC invested by local (domestic) VCs $US (1,000)” from the fi-
nancing dataset of 2006.   36 
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